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Introduction
Paramedic Dawnmarie Souza was fired in 2009 after she called her
supervisor at American Medical Response a “scumbag” on Facebook. 1
In response, Souza filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). American Medical Response justified the
firing by citing the Facebook post and additionally accusing her of
unprofessional conduct while on a call. 2 The NLRB determined that
the firing was illegal because her comment came in the context of an
online discussion about supervisory practices—a discussion protected
by law. The NLRB found that the employer’s accusations of
unprofessional conduct “appear[ed] to be pretextual.” 3 The case
settled before reaching an administrative law judge. 4
The result differed in another case dealing with discipline for
employee criticism of an employer. A BMW dealership fired salesman
Robert Becker for making two Facebook postings that portrayed the

1.

Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, to Jonathan
B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir., Region 34, regarding Am. Med. Response of
Conn., Inc., Case 34-CA-12576, at 3 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/category/case-number/34-ca-012576.

2.

Id. at 10.

3.

Id. at 11.

4.

Melanie Trottman, Workers Claim Right To Rant on Facebook, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 2011, at B1.
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dealership unfavorably. 5 The administrative law judge determined
that one posting was protected concerted activity, but the other was
not. 6 Not surprisingly, Becker and the dealership disagreed about
which post precipitated the firing. The A.L.J. found the dealership’s
testimony more credible and decided the firing for the unprotected
activity was lawful. 7 But the A.L.J. also found the dealership’s policy
that “[n]o one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other
language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership”
unlawfully chilled protected employee conduct, and the NLRB affirmed
that this policy was facially unlawful. 8
These two examples are part of a larger body of complaints. In
2011 the NLRB received over one hundred charges from employees
who were disciplined for criticizing their employers online. 9 The
NLRB determines whether to proceed with these complaints after a
case-by-case factual analysis, which led one human resources professional to ask for more guidance, saying the NLRB “comes in and is
pretty aggressive on these issues, but isn’t really clear on drawing
lines.” 10
These cases of employers disciplining employees for criticism are
hard to decide because they require a balancing of interests.
Employers want loyal employees they can trust and want to avoid the
damaging fallout that can result from insider criticism. The law
recognizes the substantial value of employee loyalty. 11 Employees, on
5.

Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (NLRB
Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011), modified by 358 N.L.R.B. 1 (2012).

6.

Id. at *9. In the protected posting, Becker complained about the quality of
the food the dealership provided for customers at a major sales event. In the
unprotected post, Becker made light of an incident where a salesperson
allowed a Land Rover to roll off the lot and into a pond. Id. at *2–3.

7.

Id. at *9.

8.

Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1 (2012) (“We find the
‘Courtesy’ rule unlawful because employees would reasonably construe
its broad prohibition against ‘disrespectful’ conduct and ‘language
which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership’ as encompassing
Section 7 activity, such as employees’ protected statements—whether
to coworkers, supervisors, managers, or third parties who deal with
the Respondent—that object to their working conditions and seek
the support of others in improving them.”).

9.

Trottman, supra note 4.

10.

Id.

11.

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958) (“Unless
otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act
solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency.”); cf. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 (2006) (“An
agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all
matters connected with the agency relationship.”).
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the other hand, want the freedom to criticize their employers. This
desire of employees to criticize employers, like the employer desire for
loyalty, can serve the interests of society as reflected in the legal
protection of certain employee conduct, such as when employees
criticize employers while advocating for collective bargaining rights12
or reporting violations of public policy. 13
Further, a wide variety of institutions and jurisdictions speak on
this issue, adding complexity the law of employee criticism. Employment and agency are generally governed by state statutory and
common law, so fifty sets of state legislatures and courts have
addressed (or failed to address) the underlying question. Federal
statutes (and for public employees, the Constitution) apply to certain
areas of employment law, adding the views of Congress, federal
courts, and executive agencies to the already clouded picture.
Despite this murkiness, cases of employees disciplined for criticism
can be divided into two classifications: those dealing with pretexts or
mixed motives, and those dealing with disloyalty. In a pretext case,
the employer puts forward a bogus justification for disciplining the
employee when the discipline was actually in response to the criticism.
This is how the NLRB viewed American Medical Response’s
justification for firing Souza. In a mixed motive case, the employer
has both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the discipline. For
instance, the BMW dealership could legally fire Becker for criticism of
the dealership’s ineptitude in allowing a Land Rover to roll into a
pond because this did not relate to a term or condition of
employment, but Becker’s criticism of low-quality food served to
customers at an event was legally protected because the dealership’s
customer service or lack thereof affected Becker’s commissions.
When employees who have engaged in both protected employer
criticism and other unprotected conduct challenge the imposition of
discipline, the seemingly crucial “distinction between a pretext case
and a dual motive case is sometimes difficult to discern.” 14 But this

12.

See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006)
(establishing and protecting employees’ right to bargain collectively,
among other rights).

13.

See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann.
§ 39-2-904 (2011) (“A discharge is wrongful . . . if . . . it was in
retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy . . . .”).

14.

Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 n.5
(1980), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line,
Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). The Board suggested the difference
can be better conceptualized by viewing the employer’s justification as
an affirmative defense: “[I]n a pretext situation, the employer’s affirmative defense of business justification is wholly without merit. If, however,
the affirmative defense has at least some merit a ‘dual motive’ may exist
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Note argues that courts and agencies are well equipped to handle such
cases because courts have a number of tools to determine the
difference, if any, between the asserted reasons for termination and
the true reasons. One tool is the burden-shifting approach adopted by
the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle. 15
Under the Mt. Healthy test, the initial burden is on the plaintiff
employee to demonstrate that the employee engaged in legally
protected conduct that was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in
the discipline. 16 Then the employer has the opportunity to prove that
it would have “reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of
the protected conduct.” 17 This approach recognizes “the practical
reality that the employer is the party with the best access to proof of
its motivation.” 18 And there is the added benefit that under the Mt.
Healthy test “there is no real need to distinguish between pretext and
dual motive cases” 19—it brings to the fore the actual motivation for
the discipline whether the asserted motive is wholly without merit,
meritorious, or somewhere in between.
This Note argues that the real problem lies with the category of
employee criticism cases where the decision is based on disloyalty. In
these cases both the employer and employee agree that the criticism
motivated the discipline. The employee argues that the criticism is
protected, but the employer counters by saying that the employee’s
lack of loyalty deprives the conduct of protection. This Note argues
that courts are not well placed to determine what disloyalty means,
and as a result, the decisions focusing on disloyalty are inconsistent.
Courts should instead focus on whether conduct by employees causes
actual detriment to the employer. This more concrete standard would
provide firmer footing for these difficult judicial determinations than
the dysfunctional standard of employee disloyalty.
The contours of the law of employee discipline for criticizing
employers are shaped by its most prominent form, termination, and in
turn by the at-will employment doctrine. Most employees in this
country are employed at will, meaning that their employers can fire
and the issue becomes one of the sufficiency of proof necessary for the
employer’s affirmative defense to be sustained.” Id.
15.

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

16.

Id. at 287. The National Labor Relations Board adopted the Mt. Healthy
test in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. In Mt. Healthy the question
was whether the conduct was protected by the First Amendment. In
Wright Line the Board dealt with issues of statutory interpretation.

17.

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.

18.

Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088.

19.

Id. at 1083 n.4.
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them for any reason. 20 Termination of at-will employment frequently
follows after employee criticism of employers. And no firing of an atwill employee will be wrongful unless it fits into an exception to the
at-will rule. Therefore, as background, this Note begins with a
discussion of the at-will employment doctrine.
Part I addresses the roots of employment law and explores the
origins of the employment-at-will doctrine and the development of
some exceptions to the rule. Part II illustrates the difference between
pretext cases and disloyalty cases. Part III addresses judicial reliance
on disloyalty in deciding employee criticism cases under the National
Labor Relations Act. Part IV explains why this reliance is misplaced.
Finally, Part V suggests that by looking to the pretext cases, courts
can develop a better methodology for resolving disloyalty cases.

I.

The Roots of Employment Law
and the Duty of Loyalty

Employment law in the United States descended from the English
common law of master and servant. 21 There was a presumption in
English law that, unless otherwise specified, employment contracts
lasted one year. 22 This rule was a reflection of loyalty and fairness in a
preindustrial, agrarian society 23—what Blackstone called “a principle
of natural equity.” 24 It would be unfair for the master to dismiss the
servant in winter when there was not much work in the fields.
Likewise, it would be unfair for the servant to be supported by the
master during the lean months of winter and leave before the heavy
work of summer.
The law of employment in the United States diverged sharply from
the old English rule in the late nineteenth century with the rise of the

20.

Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers:
Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 291
(2007) (“[M]ost employees in the United States are ‘employees-at-will’—
that is, they can be fired by their employers at any time for essentially
any reason, or for no reason at all.”).

21.

Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in
the United States, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 321 (1999).

22.

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *425.

23.

Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American”
Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1705, 1709 (2004).

24.

Blackstone, supra note 22, at *425 (“If the hiring be general, without
any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a
year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve,
and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the
respective seasons; as well when there is work to be done, as when there
is not.” (footnote omitted)).
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employment-at-will doctrine. 25 This rule has a “curious history.”26 It
first appeared in an 1877 treatise by Horace Gray Wood. 27 Later
commentators suggested that case law in 1877 did not support this
rule, but this is debated.28 Commentators posit that the rule may be
the “product of the American frontier mentality” 29 or “the natural
offspring of a capitalist economic order” 30 or the result of increased
industrialization.31 Whatever the provenance of the rule, it became the
clearly established majority rule by the early twentieth century. 32
Under this American Rule of employment at will, an employer
may terminate an employee at any time for any reason, and an
employee may leave at any time for any reason. 33 Employees are told
“if you don’t like your employer, don’t criticize or complain—leave.”34
This strict rule often led to harsh results for employees. 35
25.

Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976).

26.

Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1709.

27.

Id. at 1709–10. Wood wrote: “With us the rule is inflexible, that a
general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof.” Feinman, supra note 25, at 126 (quoting H.G.
Wood, Master and Servant § 134 (1877)).

28.

Compare Feinman, supra note 25, at 126 (noting that Wood relied on
cases that did not support his position, stated incorrectly that no
American court had recently applied the English rule, and offered no
policy grounds for the rule), with Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths:
An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment
At-Will, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 679, 681 (1994) (arguing that seven states had
adopted the rule by 1877), and Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby,
The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 Ariz. St.
L.J. 551, 554 (1990) (arguing that the four cases cited by Wood
supported his proposition).

29.

Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1709.

30.

Freed & Polsby, supra note 28, at 558.

31.

But see Morriss, supra note 28, at 681 (refuting the “myth” that the
rule was the byproduct of increased industrialization).

32.

Matheny & Crain, supra note 23, at 1710.

33.

Id. at 1709.

34.

In this way it is similar to the “Wall Street Rule” that held sway in the
stock market for much of the last century: “If you don’t like management,
sell your stock,” and if you don’t sell, vote with management and don’t
complain. Melvin Aron Eisenberg & James D. Cox, Corporations
and Other Business Organizations 304 (10th ed. 2011).

35.

See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 Comp. Lab.
L. & Pol’y J. 773, 778 (2011) (“Although employment-at-will has been
firmly in place for well over a century, state judges in recent decades
have become more cognizant of the doctrine’s harsh consequences.”);
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In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, state courts reacted
to the harshness of a strict at-will rule and began to fashion common
law exceptions. 36 By 1993, the courts of forty-eight states had created
significant exceptions to the at-will default rule. 37 The three most
common judicial exceptions are the public policy exception, the
implied contract exception, and the exception for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 38 The most significant of these
in the context of employee criticism is the public policy exception.
Additionally, there are statutory exceptions, the most prominent of
which are in the federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).39
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees have the right to
“engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 40 Section 8 makes it “an
unfair labor practice” for employers to discharge or discipline employees
who exercise their rights under section 7.41 The NLRA covers a broad
range of activities and employees.

II. The Public Policy Exception and the Difference
Between Pretext and Disloyalty Cases
The adoption of a “presumption of employment at will effectively
shielded employers from legal challenges to their termination
decisions.” 42 But this presumption was weakened in many states by
common law decisions during a period of “intense judicial activity” in
the 1980s and 1990s. 43 During this period, discharged employees
bringing suits for wrongful discharge were increasingly successful.

Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1844
(1980) (“This at will rule is based on outdated assumptions and leads to
unnecessarily harsh results.”).
36.

Brudney, supra note 35, at 778; David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz,
State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement,
and Rationales, 33 Am. Bus. L.J. 645, 655–57 (1996).

37.

Morriss, supra note 28, at 682.

38.

Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major
Exceptions, Bureau of Lab. Stat. Monthly Lab. Rev., Jan. 2001,
at 3–4, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf.

39.

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006); see Aaron & Finkin, supra note 21, at 330
(describing this method of attacking employment-at-will).

40.

29 U.S.C. § 157.

41.

Id. § 158.

42.

Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 646.

43.

Id. at 645.
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Today, forty-three states recognize a public policy exception to the
presumption of at-will employment. 44
The public policy exception to at-will employment recognizes that
employers’ private interests can conflict with the public good. 45 One of
the major rationales for the doctrine is the need to “uphold or
effectuate legislatively determined public policy.” 46 Yet courts made it
clear that the exception is limited and should not be construed as to
overwhelm the rule. 47
In the 1980s, the number of courts adopting the public policy
exception increased dramatically. Before 1980, the courts of only eight
states had adopted the exception, but by the end of the decade the
total stood at forty states. 48 Between 1983 and 1986 alone, fourteen
states adopted the doctrine. 49 A primary reason for this “snowballing”
effect was judicial awareness of the trend. 50 The doctrine gained
legitimacy as more states signed on.
A few states have gone beyond common law and codified the
public policy exception into statute. One of the first to do so was
Montana. 51 Other states followed. 52 Colorado adopted a statute that
44.

Id. at 648. Subsequent to the Walsh and Schwarz survey, Ohio also
recognized the public policy exception. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.,
677 N.E.2d 308, 328–29 (Ohio 1997).

45.

Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 646.

46.

Id. at 662; see also Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (“[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state’s declared
policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his
generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is
for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the
employee’s refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be
without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law.”).

47.

See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988)
(“This is a limited exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. It is
not meant to protect merely private or proprietary interests.”); Vigil v.
Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (“We do not abrogate
the at will rule; we only limit its application to those situations where
the employee’s discharge results from the employer’s violation of a clear
public policy.”), overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Manville
Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).

48.

Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 36, at 656 fig.1.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 663; see also, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d
1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (“We join the growing majority of jurisdictions
and recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the
discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public
policy.”).

51.

Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-904 (2011) (originally enacted by 1987 Mont.
Laws ch. 641, § 4) (“A discharge is wrongful . . . if . . . it was in
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differs from Montana’s in that it protects employees from discharge
due to lawful activities outside of work. 53
Two Colorado decisions demonstrate the difference between
“pretext” and “disloyalty” cases. In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz,
the Colorado Supreme Court ordered a trial after finding prima facie
evidence that the discharge of an employee who criticized his
employer violated public policy. 54 Paul Lorenz was an engineer at
Martin Marietta responsible for quality control on projects involving
equipment for NASA’s space shuttle program. 55 Lorenz became
concerned about the lack of proper testing and poor communication
with NASA engineers. 56 When his supervisors did not respond
favorably to his concerns, Lorenz took his “evaluations and criticisms”
directly to NASA personnel. 57 As a result of Lorenz’s criticisms,
representatives from Martin Marietta and NASA attended a technical
review session. Lorenz took minutes of the meeting. Afterwards,
retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy . . . .”).
52.

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) (2012) (codifying
the Arizona Supreme Court’s creation of a civil damages remedy for
employees discharged in violation of an Arizona statute); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1) (West 2012) (prohibiting employers from
discharging an employee because the employee reported in good faith a
violation of federal or state law); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:19-1 to -14
(West 2011) (creating a civil action for employees discharged in
retaliation for disclosing an unlawful policy or practice of the employer).
But see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 34-7-1 (2011) (codifying the employmentat-will doctrine without a statutory public policy exception).

53.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (2012):
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an
employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to
that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises
of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a
restriction:
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is
reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a
particular group of employees, rather than to all employees
of the employer; or
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a
conflict of interest.

54.

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 100 (Colo. 1992) (en
banc).

55.

Id. at 102.

56.

Id. at 103.

57.

Id.
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Martin Marietta officials instructed Lorenz to modify the minutes.
Lorenz refused to do so, and he wrote a memorandum calling the
changes “not mere corrections but rather . . . retractions of important
representations made by Martin Marietta officials.” 58 His supervisor
told him to “start playing ball with management.” 59 After another
incident where Lorenz complained that the lack of sufficient testing
by Martin Marietta “would constitute a fraud on NASA,” 60 Lorenz
was laid off for “lack of work,” even though he was extremely busy at
the time. 61
Faced with these facts, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized
for the first time a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 62 Lorenz
alleged that Martin Marietta ordered him to commit fraud on NASA,
an agency of the United States government, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. 63 The court said there “is no question” that perpetrating a
fraud on the federal government is against the public policy of
Colorado. 64 “In light of Colorado’s long-standing rule that a contract
violative of public policy is unenforceable,” the court found it
“axiomatic” that termination of an at-will employee “should also be
deemed unenforceable when violative of public policy.” 65
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 103–04.

62.

Id. at 108. The Colorado Court of Appeals had previously recognized
the exception in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 765 P.2d
619 (Colo. App. 1988). The Lorenz court explicitly approved Cronk
“with minor modifications.” Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108.

63.

The statute provides that
whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up . . . a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years
. . . or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).

64.

Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.

65.

Id.
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Because of the posture of the case, the court did not reach a
decision on the merits. Instead, it decided that Lorenz presented
enough “evidence at trial to establish a prima facie case for wrongful
discharge” and ordered a new trial. 66 In doing so, the court confirmed
the elements of the cause of action: (1) an employee plaintiff was
directed “to perform an illegal act as part of the employee’s work
related duties or prohibited . . . from performing a public duty or
exercising an important job-related right or privilege”; (2) the ordered
action “violate[d] a specific statute relating to the public health,
safety, or welfare, or . . . undermine[d] a clearly expressed public
policy”; (3) “the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to
perform the act directed by the employer”; and (4) the employer
knew or should have known that the ordered act was illegal or
contrary to public policy. 67
Lorenz is an example of a pretext case, and it shows how courts
are able to effectively deal with pretextual employee discipline. Martin
Marietta claimed it was laying Lorenz off due to “lack of work.” 68
Lorenz argued that this justification was “blatant pretext.” 69 Because
of the posture of the case, the Colorado Supreme Court did not
determine whether it was pretext, but had it gone to trial on remand,
the trial court would have taken evidence on the issue of pretext and
made a determination. 70
Compare Lorenz to Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., where the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado determined
whether a discharge for public criticism violated the Colorado
wrongful discharge statute. 71 Delta Airlines employee Michael Marsh
was upset with Delta’s decision to replace laid-off employees with
temporary workers. Marsh wrote a critical letter to the editor of the
Denver Post, 72 and Delta subsequently fired him “for conduct
unbecoming a Delta employee.” 73
66.

Id. at 111.

67.

Id. at 109.

68.

Id. at 104.

69.

Answer Brief on Certiorari at 11, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823
P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90SC583), 1991 WL 11034482 at *11.

70.

Presumably one reason there was no trial on remand is that the
justification most likely was “blatant pretext.” And, according to
Lorenz, Martin Marietta “admitted that Lorenz’ [sic] objections to
design deficiencies was the real reason for his termination.” Id.

71.

Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1997).

72.

The letter read, in part:
Delta Air Lines, a company which is renowned worldwide for its
corporate family culture, enthusiastic and professional employees
and superior service to customers, has decided to flush 60 years
[sic] worth of care and paternalism down the executive
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The court found “an implied duty of loyalty” in the “bona fide
occupational requirements” of the statute. 74 It also rejected Marsh’s
claim that he was acting as a whistleblower and consequently
protected under Colorado law. Marsh “was not exposing public safety
concerns, instead he was [merely] a disgruntled worker venting his
frustrations.” 75
Marsh is a “disloyalty” case and harder to deal with than Lorenz.
Loyalty is not mentioned at all in the statute, which instead makes an
exception for “bona fide occupational requirement[s].” 76 From this, the
court inferred that the statute created a “duty of loyalty, with regard
to public communications, that employees owe to their employers.” 77
But, except to say that “loyalty” protects companies’ reputations
from the “indiscriminate public blows” of employees, the court did not
explain what “loyalty” means. Loyalty is not a legal term of art, and
relying on this word in judicial decisions is problematic. 78

washroom toilet, putting thousands of loyal Delta employees and
their families on hold or in the street.
The company is convinced it can continue to deliver its
traditional high levels of customer service with $6 an hour help.
The thinking here, apparently, is that what works for the fastfood industry should work for the airline business just as handily.
....
In betraying the trust and loyalty of more than 60,000 dedicated
employees, Delta has lost the very thing that made it so
prosperous and efficient over six decades.
And now has come the ultimate insult: Delta
called together and told that they would be
training the cheap contract help that would be
This curious mandate speaks to corporate
ignorance of the first magnitude.

employees were
responsible for
replacing them.
arrogance and

Id. at 1460–61.
73.

Id. at 1461.

74.

Id. at 1463.

75.

Id.

76.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2012).

77.

Marsh, 952 F. Supp. at 1463 (“By providing exceptions to the statute’s
general rule, the legislature indicated that it did not intend this privacy
statute to provide a sword to employees thereby allowing employees to
strike indiscriminate public blows against the business reputation of
their employer.”).

78.

See infra Part IV.
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III. Disloyalty Standards Under
the National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA protects a broad range of employees and activities.
While the NLRA is most commonly considered in the context of union
organizing, the definition of employees under the Act is broad and
covers most privately employed individuals. 79 Covered employees have
the right to participate in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection.” 80 The Act shields many concerted activities
that would otherwise be considered “disloyal.” 81 For example, work
stoppages may be protected, depending on the circumstances. 82
The extent to which disciplining employees’ criticism of employers
is permissible under the NLRA is muddled. In the leading Supreme
Court case, known as Jefferson Standard, labor negotiations between
a television station in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the technicians’
union broke down. 83 The technicians distributed handbills that
criticized the station’s lack of live programming and suggested that
the station considered Charlotte “a second class community.” 84 Ten
79.

Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employer Interests, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 922 (1992) (“[S]ection 7 also protects
employee protest and advocacy unrelated to traditional union activity.”).
The NLRA defines “employee” as “any employee” except for agricultural
labors, individuals employed by a parent or spouse, independent
contractors, and certain railroad employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).

80.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).

81.

Aaron & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331.

82.

See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10 (1962) (enforcing an
NLRB decision reinstating seven unorganized employees who walked off
the job because it was too cold in the shop where they were working).
But see NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255, 260
(1939) (refusing to reinstate workers who engaged in a “sit-down strike”
because they were trespassing on their employer’s property).

83.

NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson
Standard ), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).

84.

Id. at 468. The handbills read in full as follows:
IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY?
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being
presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over
WBTV. Have you seen one of their television programs lately?
Did you know that all the programs presented over WBTV are
on film and may be from one day to five years old. There are no
local programs presented by WBTV. You cannot receive the
local baseball games, football games or other local events
because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make
these pickups. Cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, [and]
Washington receive such programs nightly. Why doesn’t the
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company purchase the needed
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technicians were fired for these handbills. The union challenged the
firings as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court focused on whether the technicians were
discharged “for cause,” which is permitted and not an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA. 85 The Court called the handbills “a vitriolic
attack” and noted that they did not refer to the labor controversy but
instead attacked the quality of the company’s service to its customers. 86 The Court noted that Congress did not intend for section 7 to
“weaken the underlying . . . bonds and loyalties of employer and
employee” 87 and reasoned that “[t]here is no more elemental cause for
discharge than disloyalty to [one’s] employer.” 88 The distribution of
the handbills was “of such detrimental disloyalty” to the company as
to justify the firings. 89
The Court thus raised the question of what qualifies as
“disloyalty.” In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black
and Douglas, warned that “to float such imprecise notions as
‘discipline’ and ‘loyalty’ in the context of labor controversies, as the
basis of a right to discharge, is to open the door wide to individual
judgment by Board members and judges.” 90 Frankfurter worried that
these imprecise terms would not provide guidance to the lower courts
and would therefore “needlessly stimulate litigation.” 91 Lack of clarity
was “the near universal judgment of contemporaneous and later
students of Jefferson Standard.” 92 And history proved Justice Frankfurter and the early critics prescient. Subsequent decisions by the lower
courts and the National Labor Relations Board varied significantly. 93
equipment to bring you the same type of programs enjoyed by
other leading American cities? Could it be that they consider
Charlotte a second-class community and only entitled to the
pictures now being presented to them?
Id.
85.

Id. at 465.

86.

Id. at 468.

87.

Id. at 473.

88.

Id. at 472.

89.

Id.

90.

Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

91.

Id.

92.

Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 541, 547 (2007).

93.

This phenomenon might be exacerbated by the political nature of the
NLRB. The five-member Board is appointed by the President to
staggered five-year terms. After a few years in office, the sitting
President’s appointees will constitute a majority of the Board, and
decisions may then reflect the leaning of the party in control of the
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In Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 94 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced a
Board decision reinstating a nurse who had been dropped from fulltime employment for “disloyal conduct.” 95 The nurse gave a television
interview in which she criticized the hospital’s staffing levels as well
as the salary and benefits of nurses. 96 Because her statements were
“directly related to protected concerted activities . . . in progress,” the
court distinguished the facts from Jefferson Standard and rejected the
hospital’s assertion that the statements were unprotected. 97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reached a similar result in NLRB v. New York University Medical
Center 98—albeit via different reasoning. Several employees handed
out leaflets to other hospital employees in advance of a union election.
The leaflets were harshly critical of the hospital, accusing it of turning
its “security guards into a fascist gestapo illegally searching workers
and firing them.” 99 The hospital suspended several of the employees
who distributed the leaflets and terminated one. It recognized that
employees had a general right to distribute leaflets but argued that
the contents of these specific leaflets were disruptive of discipline and
“manifested disloyalty to the employer and hence lost all protection
under the Act.” 100 The court found the leafleting was a protected
activity because the leaflets were aimed at other employees and,
unlike in Jefferson Standard, they did not disparage the employer’s
product. 101

White House. See Charles T. Goodsell & Ceferina C. Gayo, Appointive
Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 Admin. L. Rev. 291
(1971); see also Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095,
1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain
substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the
changing compositions of the Board.”).
94.

Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.
1976), enforcing 220 N.L.R.B. 217 (1975).

95.

Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 217, 222 (1975).

96.

538 F.2d at 609. The hospital, when admonishing the nurse, admitted
that her critical statements may have been true but nevertheless
complained that “the impression that you created with the public was
disastrous to the hospital as far as [management] was concerned.” Id.

97.

Id. at 610.

98.

NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), vacated, 464
U.S. 805 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1984)
(unpublished table decision).

99.

Id. at 286.

100. Id. at 289.
101. Id. at 292.

931

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
Dysfunctional Disloyalty Standards in Employee Criticism Cases

In the first thirty years after Jefferson Standard, lower courts
thus developed two analyses of criticism that is sufficiently “disloyal”
to be excluded from section 7 protection. The Community Hospital
analysis focused on the relationship between the criticism and
concerted activity. New York University Medical Center focused on
whether the employee disparaged the employer’s product as opposed
to criticizing the employer’s labor practices.
In Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, decided a few years later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized both
of these analyses but gave much more weight to the analysis of
relatedness to concerted activity. 102 The court explained that later
cases “confined” the reach of the disparagement analysis, “and made
clear that Jefferson Standard was not to be read to equate criticism
with disloyal product disparagement. Instead, appeals to third parties
forfeit [section] 7 protection only if their connection to the employees’
working conditions is too attenuated.” 103 The court also noted that
“the NLRB has progressively narrowed the areas of activity found to
be unprotected because of disloyalty.” 104
The dispute in Sierra Publishing arose out of collective bargaining
negotiations between The Sacramento Union and the Northern
California Newspaper Guild, which represented most of the paper’s
nonsupervisory personnel. 105 After the two sides were unable to reach
an agreement, members of the guild’s bargaining committee sent a
letter to the newspaper’s advertisers. The letter explained that as a
result of stalled negotiations, the newspaper was “speeding downhill,”
and the committee asked advertisers to call management to “help us
save the . . . newspaper.” 106 The newspaper then discharged the
employees responsible for the letter for disloyally disparaging the
paper. The NLRB ordered reinstatement. 107
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the NLRB and enforced the
decision. Summarizing the law, the court wrote that “the disloyalty
standard is at base a question of whether the employees’ efforts to
improve their wages or working conditions through influencing
strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner
102. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989),
enforcing 291 N.L.R.B. 540 (1988) (calling the relatedness analysis
“central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jefferson Standard, and
. . . the [continued] focus of NLRB and judicial analysis”).
103. Id. at 216 (citing for this proposition, among others, Cmty. Hosp. of
Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 213–14.
106. Id. at 214.
107. Sierra Publ’g Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540, 550–51 (1988).
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under the circumstances.” 108 Disparaging an employer’s product is
unreasonable if not connected to a labor dispute, but when the
employer’s treatment of its employees may negatively affect product
quality, criticism is likely reasonable. 109 Sierra Publishing’s narrow
and employee-friendly reading of Jefferson Standard diminished the
force of the Court’s “detrimental disloyalty” standard that had been
applied since the 1950s.
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit “breathed fresh life into” Jefferson Standard. 110 In
Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc. v. NLRB, the court set aside
the Board’s decision calling for the reinstatement of an employee
terminated for criticism. 111 Endicott Interconnect Technologies (EIT)
purchased a circuit board manufacturing facility from IBM. Two
weeks after the sale, EIT laid off ten percent of its new workforce.
The local paper quoted an EIT employee, Richard White, in an article
about the downsizing. White told the paper that there were “gaping
holes” in the company after the layoffs. 112
EIT management accused White of “disparag[ing] the Company
in violation of the company Handbook” and “threatened to terminate
[him] if it happened again.” 113 A week later White posted a message
on the newspaper’s public comment forum. White’s pro-union message
argued that “no one else [but the union] will help” stop “all the bad
things that IBM and EIT have done to the employees and their
families and the community at large” and that the “business is being
tanked by a group of people that have no good ability to manage
it.” 114 EIT management determined that White had “disparaged EIT
again” and discharged him. 115
The NLRB, in a two-to-one decision, found that White’s statements were protected and ordered his reinstatement. 116 The Board
108. Sierra Publ’g, 889 F.2d at 220.
109. Id. (suggesting that “[p]roduct disparagement unconnected to the labor
dispute, breach of important confidences, and threats of violence” are
probably unreasonable, while casting as probably reasonable “suggestions
that a company’s treatment of its employees may have an effect upon
the quality of the company’s products, . . . or the company’s own
viability”).
110. Finkin, supra note 92, at 541.
111. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 534.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 534–35.
115. Id. at 535.
116. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448, 460 (2005).
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concluded that White’s statements were connected to a labor dispute
and therefore “concerted activities” under section 7. 117 The statements
“were ‘not so misleading, inaccurate, or reckless, or otherwise outside
the bounds of permissible speech, to cause [him] to lose the Act’s
protection.’ ” 118 Citing Jefferson Standard, the Board determined that
“White’s statements evince no more than the kind of bias and
hyperbole that the Board has found within the acceptable limits of
Section 7.” 119
The District of Columbia Circuit disagreed. While accepting the
Board’s formulation of the Jefferson Standard holding and its
determination that White’s statements were part of an ongoing labor
dispute, the court concluded that “the Board misapplied the second
part of the test.” 120 It did not matter that White’s statements were
not misleading, inaccurate, or reckless because the Board had left one
attribute off the list—disloyalty. “And White’s communications were
unquestionably detrimentally disloyal.” 121 Therefore White was not
protected by the NLRA, his discharge was legal, and the Board’s
decision was vacated.
The District of Columbia Circuit’s interpretation of Jefferson
Standard disloyalty conflicts with the interpretation by the Ninth
Circuit in Sierra Publishing. The Ninth Circuit focused on the
connection between the criticism and concerted activity. But even
though the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Board’s
determination that the criticism in Endicott was connected to
concerted activity, 122 it nevertheless vacated White’s reinstatement. 123
The Endicott decision is also at odds with New York University
Medical Center and other cases that analyze whether the criticism is
aimed at the employer’s product or its labor practices. In deciding that
White’s statements were “detrimentally disloyal,” the District of
Columbia Circuit focused on harm to EIT’s product and customer
relationships. The court more than once mentioned the adverse reaction

117. Id.
118. Id. at 451 (quoting Titanium Metals Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 766, 766 n.3
(2003), enforcement denied on other grounds, 392 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir.
2004)).
119. Id. at 451–52.
120. Endicott, 453 F.3d at 537.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 535.
123. Id. at 536 (“[T]he fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords
. . . no substantial defense.” (quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229,
Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard ), 346 U.S. 464, 476
(1953))).
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of IBM on reading the interview. 124 But the court could have just as
easily said that White was not criticizing EIT’s products, but rather its
labor practices, namely laying off ten percent of its workforce. Certainly
other courts would have decided this case the other way. 125
Even the Jefferson Standard Court might have decided Endicott
differently. The Jefferson Standard Court emphasized that the technicians’ handbills made no reference to any labor dispute. Had the
handbills done so, the public would have read them with a more
discerning eye, knowing that the technicians were self-interested.126
This lack of disclosure was a major reason that the Court found the
technicians disloyal. In Endicott, there was no doubt that White was
criticizing labor practices—the newspaper’s article and Internet forum
were about the layoffs.
The language Endicott cited from Jefferson Standard—“[t]he
fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords . . . no substantial defense” 127—has a slightly different meaning when read in its
original context. In the paragraph immediately preceding this
sentence, the Jefferson Standard Court described the unrelatedness of
the criticism in the handbills to the labor dispute. 128 The lack of this
124. See id. at 534 (“[IBM] expressed concern over whether EIT had ‘gutted’
its engineering staff and as a consequence had ‘gaping holes.’ ”); id. at
537 (“The damaging effect of the disloyal statements, made by an
experienced insider at a time when EIT was struggling to get up and
running under new management, is obvious from the immediate reaction
of IBM’s vice president, who telephoned [an EIT official] concerned
about EIT’s continuing ability to supply IBM’s circuit board needs.”).
125. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NRLB. 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“[S]uggestions that a company’s treatment of its employees may have
an effect upon the quality of the company’s products, or may even affect
the company’s own viability are not likely to be unreasonable,
particularly in cases when the addressees of the information are made
aware of the fact that a labor dispute is in progress.”).
126. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476–77 (“The only connection between
the handbill and the labor controversy was an ultimate and undisclosed
motive on the part of some of the sponsors that, by the hoped-for
financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company some
future concession. A disclosure of that motive might have lost more
public support for the employees than it would have gained, for it would
have given the handbill more the character of coercion than of collective
bargaining.”).
127. Endicott, 453 F.3d at 536 (quoting Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476).
128. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476 (“[The technicians’] attack related
itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no reference to
wages, hours or working conditions. The policies attacked were those of
finance and public relations for which management, not technicians,
must be responsible. . . . It was a continuing attack, initiated while off
duty, upon the very interests which the attackers were being paid to
preserve and develop.”).
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connection is what makes the existence of a labor dispute fortuitous.
Had the handbills criticized the wages, hours, or working conditions of
the company, the labor dispute would not be fortuitous but would be
the handbills’ obvious raison d’être. The unrelated criticism in
Jefferson Standard stands in sharp contrast to White’s criticism of
the layoffs, a labor practice of his employer. In Endicott, the coexistence of a labor dispute was not a mere fortunate happenstance.
One academic has criticized the District of Columbia Circuit for
following Jefferson Standard. Professor Matthew Finkin argued that
the “legal and ideological underpinnings of Jefferson Standard have
become thoroughly eroded over the ensuing half century; that, at
best, disloyalty is a worthless guide to decision; at worst, it chills
speech of social value, and ought to be abandoned.” 129 According to
Finkin, developments in the jurisprudence of public employee free
speech have changed the employment law landscape. 130 For example,
starting with Pickering v. Board of Education, 131 the duty of loyalty
not to criticize one’s employer “abutted freedom of speech.” 132 At least
when dealing with matters of “legitimate public concern,” public
employees could criticize their public employer. 133 Finkin also noted
the changes that have occurred since 1953 in common law tort
doctrine—“that an employee in the private sector publicly criticizes
her company’s product or management can no longer be said to be
such an act of disloyalty as to warrant discharge per se.” 134

IV. The Problem of Reliance on “Disloyalty”
The passage of time has confirmed the accuracy of Justice
Frankfurter’s warning that “the courts of appeals [would] hardly find
guidance” from Jefferson Standard. 135 Attempting to rely on the
“imprecise notion[ ]” 136 of disloyalty led the circuit courts to develop
at least four different analyses. The Fourth Circuit found that
129. Finkin, supra note 92, at 541.
130. See id. at 551–53 (“[N]o longer do we see an employee’s public utterance
critical of the quality of her employer’s management or service as an
egregious breach of the duty of loyalty, we see it today as an act of
responsible citizenship that contributes to a constitutionally valued
robust debate on matters of legitimate public concern whatever the
potential impact on the employer’s ‘bottom line.’ ”).
131. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
132. Finkin, supra note 92, at 551.
133. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571.
134. Finkin, supra note 92, at 553–54.
135. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson
Standard ), 346 U.S. 464, 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
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criticism “directly related to protected concerted activities” was not
disloyal. 137 The Second Circuit found that criticism that was “directed
at fellow employees” and did not “publicly disparage the employer’s
product” was not disloyal. 138 The Ninth Circuit distanced itself from
the disparagement analysis and instead adopted a reasonableness
standard. 139 And the District of Columbia Circuit returned full-circle
to Jefferson Standard by deciding that “disloyal, disparaging and
injurious . . . attacks” lose protection without further qualification or
analysis. 140 And, while not interpreting the NLRA or Jefferson
Standard, the Colorado District Court relied on loyalty to prevent
what it considered the “indiscriminate public blows” of an
employee. 141
The reason these decisions are problematic is that “loyalty” and
“disloyalty” are not legal terms of art. Dictionaries are of no avail. 142
Nor does Justice Cardozo’s famous formulation of “finest loyalty”—
“[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive” 143—help to resolve these cases. The Restatement of Agency
is somewhat more precise, explaining in a comment that an “agent is
. . . under a duty not to act or speak disloyally in matters which are
connected with his employment except in the protection of his own
interests or those of others.” 144 But even this only describes the
situation; it does not give guidance on how to resolve it.
One could conceive of the employment-at-will doctrine as placing
an obligation on employees not to act or speak disloyally, as disloyalty
saps the will to employ and may lead to termination. But the common
law public policy exception, the Colorado statute, and the NLRA
recognize interests that an employee can protect—the right to speak
out when the employer violates the law, the right to participate in
lawful activities outside the workplace, and the right to engage in con137. Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610
(1975).
138. NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 292 (2d Cir.), vacated,
464 U.S. 804 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1984)
(unpublished table decision).
139. Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
141. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (D. Colo. 1997).
142. Compare Black’s Law Dictionary 1033 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
loyalty as “[f]aithfulness or allegiance to a person, cause, duty, or
government”), with Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1342 (1986) (defining loyalty as “fidelity or tenacious
adherence (as to a government, principle, practice, or custom)”).
143. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
144. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 cmt. b (1958).
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certed action. Sometimes, as recognized by the Restatement comment,
protecting these interests requires an employee to speak disloyally.
The Jefferson Standard Court recognized that while the NLRA
protects some conduct or speech that would otherwise be considered
disloyal, 145 there comes a point where disloyalty crosses the line,
becomes “detrimental,” 146 and thus justifies dismissal “for cause”
under section 10. 147 The problem posed by this and similar cases is
locating that line. As Justice Frankfurter explained, “ ‘Concerted
activities’ by employees and dismissal ‘for cause’ by employers are not
dissociated legal criteria under the Act. They are like the two halves
of a pair of shears.” 148 Using this analogy, it is the job of courts to
determine where the shears meet the paper.
The problem with courts relying on “disloyalty” is not in defining
the word, but rather in using the word to define this boundary. 149
Employing such a sweeping and imprecise term “open[s] the door wide
to individual judgment by Board members and judges.” 150 It simply
does not enable consistent judicial resolution.
Moreover, equating criticism with disloyalty is a mistake. If your
company is doing things you disagree with, is it more loyal to quit
your job or to stay and advocate for change? Economist Albert
Hirschman defined loyalty as “[t]he reluctance to exit in spite of
disagreement with the organization of which one is a member.” 151
Michael Marsh and Richard White did not want to hurt their companies. Marsh was concerned that the quality of customer service at
Delta would decrease if experienced employees were replaced by
temporary workers. White worried that the layoffs at EIT would hurt
the company in the long run. They did not want to leave, and they
fought hard to reclaim their jobs when discharged. Under Hirschman’s
145. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers (Jefferson
Standard ), 346 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“Many of the legally recognized tactics and weapons of labor would
readily be condemned for ‘disloyalty’ were they employed between man
and man in friendly personal relations.”).
146. Id. at 472 (majority opinion).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (“No order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended
or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
was suspended or discharged for cause.”).
148. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 480 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
149. Another problem with courts employing a “disloyalty” standard is the
strong emotions it conjures up. Few faults are as reviled as disloyalty:
Dante reserved the center of hell for those guilty of treachery and names
like Benedict Arnold and Vidkun Quisling have entered the lexicon.
150. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
151. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 98 (1970).
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definition, their criticisms were manifestations of loyalty, not
disloyalty.

V. An Objective, Burden-Shifting Solution
Courts should take a lesson from what they are able to do well:
place the burden on the parties to bring forward evidence to
substantiate their factual claims. This is what courts do in the pretext
and mixed motive contexts, and they could also do so in the
disloyalty context. This Part examines how cases addressing discipline
of employees who criticize employers can be more effectively resolved
under this burden-shifting framework.
The Jefferson Standard Court held that the conduct of the
technicians—passing out the critical flyers—removed them from the
protection of the NLRA because it manifested “detrimental
disloyalty.” 152 And while “disloyalty” is not a standard that courts are
well positioned to determine, the same is not true for “detrimental.” If
prompted, the parties could have presented evidence on whether the
actions of the technicians actually were detrimental to the television
station. Justice Frankfurter called for this type of inquiry in his
dissent: “[O]n a remand the Board could properly be asked to leave
no doubt whether the technicians, in distributing the handbills, were,
so far as the public could tell, on a frolic of their own . . . .” 153
This type of inquiry would provide a more concrete basis for
judicial determination, but courts should go further and utilize the
additional tool of burden shifting. Evidence about whether employee
criticism has actually impaired the employer is likely to be in the
hands of the employer. This parallels the situations in Mt. Healthy,
where the school was the party with knowledge of what actually
motivated the teacher’s firing, 154 and Wright Line, where only the
employer knew whether it was the employee’s union activities or
alleged timesheet falsification that led to the firing. 155 The Court has
employed similar burden-shifting approaches in other work-related
cases. 156 It would be effective here as well.
152. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
154. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
155. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088
(1980) (noting “the practical reality that the employer is the party with
the best access to proof of its motivation”), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
156. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270–71 n.21 (1977) (noting in a rezoning case that proof of an
impermissible racial motivation would have “shifted to the Village the
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even
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Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly employ burden
shifting in NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, the court
did analyze the content of the criticism to determine if it had been
detrimental. The employees’ leaflets accused the hospital of using
gestapo tactics. 157 The hospital argued that this “provocative
language” was “disruptive of discipline.” 158 The court recognized the
need to “determine if the language in the leaflets was likely to
produce misconduct or generally disrupt discipline.” 159 But the
hospital did not “produce[ ] any evidence that it had a reasonable
expectation that misconduct would ensue,” 160 and the court held “that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the
objectionable language in the leaflets posed no danger of breach of
employee discipline.” 161 The Second Circuit’s analysis demonstrates
that this approach is practical and effective. This approach is further
supported by the decisions of other courts that have analyzed the
critical language for detrimental effects on the employer. 162

had the impermissible purpose not been considered”); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring employers
in Title VII civil rights actions to show a legitimate business reason for
disciplining an employee once the employee has established a prima facie
case of discrimination); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967) (“[O]nce it has been proved that the employer engaged in
discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee
rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that
he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is
most accessible to him.”).
157. NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 286 (2d Cir.), vacated,
464 U.S. 804 (1983), aff’d on remand, 751 F.2d 370 (2d. Cir. 1984)
(unpublished table decision).
158. Id. at 289.
159. Id. at 290.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 291.
162. See, e.g., NLRB v. Owners Maint. Corp., 581 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1978)
(analyzing leaflets for disparagement, “deliberate or reckless untruths,”
and violence); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 329
(7th Cir. 1976) (“[C]ommunications occurring during the course of
otherwise protected activity remain likewise protected unless found to
be ‘so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee
unfit for further service.’ ” (quoting NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d
811, 816 (7th Cir. 1946))); cf. Md. Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538,
541 (4th Cir. 1950) (“The right of the company to prohibit the
distribution of insulting and defamatory literature must necessarily
depend upon the character of the literature itself and the effect which it
might normally be expected to produce, not upon ex post facto proof of
the results which actually flowed from its distribution.”).
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This method also illustrates the problem in Endicott Interconnect
Technologies. The District of Columbia Circuit called White’s
communications “unquestionably detrimentally disloyal,” 163 but it is
not clear exactly what the detriment was. The court focused on the
concerned phone call from IBM, the company’s main customer, and
suggested that the “damaging effect . . . is obvious.” 164 But a
customer’s call or concern is not any more “unquestionable” or
“obvious” in this context than it would be in the context of clearly
protected concerted action such as a strike. It is not hard to imagine
that IBM would have been more concerned and perhaps would have
called EIT or even shifted its business elsewhere had it received word
of a strike at the plant. 165
One possible criticism of the suggested approach is that it just
moves the line. Under a “detrimental” standard, courts will still have
to determine just how much detriment is necessary to cause the
criticism to be unprotected. In Endicott, the District of Columbia
Circuit thought a nervous telephone conversation with a customer
was enough detriment. But the Ninth Circuit recognized that not all
economic harm is sufficient to justify removing otherwise protected
employee conduct from the aegis of the NLRA, and instead focused on
the reasonableness of the means under the circumstances.
The truth is that no clear, bright line can be drawn to solve these
cases. Each case must be examined on its own facts. 166 But while this
is the reality facing courts, detriment is a more concrete and
determinable standard than disloyalty. Unlike disloyalty inquiries that
focus on the subjective, detriment to the employer may be shown
objectively. And since the employer is typically the party with the
best access to evidence of objective detriment, the employer should
bear the burden of producing evidence of detriment when challenged
for disciplining an employee for criticism.
The objectivity of the detriment standard not only serves to
protect employees and facilitate adjudication, but it also greatly
enhances the disciplinary process for employers. When faced with an
employee’s disparaging Facebook posting, employers face uncertainty
163. Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
164. Id.
165. See Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
mere fact that economic pressure may be brought to bear on one side or
the other is not determinative, even if some economic harm is actually
suffered. The proper focus must be the manner by which that harm is
brought about.”).
166. See id. (“Each situation must be examined on its own facts, but with an
understanding that the law does favor a robust exchange of
viewpoints.”).
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in the legality of a disciplinary response under the disloyalty
standard. The employer has no objective indicia of the elements of
disloyalty. While employers can respond to this uncertainty by erring
on the side of not disciplining employees, this approach leaves them
open to the very “indiscriminate public blows” of employee criticism
that the disloyalty standard is designed to shield from employers. 167
The disciplinary process for employers facing employee criticism is
better off if the standard for discipline of employees who criticize
employers is based on whether the criticism causes a detriment to the
employers business. The employer can investigate the conduct and its
consequences to determine whether the employer has been harmed,
looking for evidence of detriment. If the employer finds no such
evidence, the employer saves face by not responding to the harmless
criticism. If the employer finds substantial evidence of detriment, the
legality of discipline is more certain, and it may be imposed with far
less anxiety than the employer would face under the subjective
disloyalty standard.
In this way, the solution serves the interests of both employers
and employees. Detriment is a better line to fight on than disloyalty
because the inquiry is objective. It carves out for legal protection
harmless criticism. And when handbills, leaflets, speeches, and
Facebook posts are directed at improving the terms and conditions of
employment, the evident self-interested nature of the criticism shields
the employer from harm that is not a consequence of labor practices.

Conclusion
Employee criticism raises conflicting social values: the need for
employers to have loyal workers who do not undermine the company
and the need for employees to speak critically when the employer’s
practices are inappropriate. While loyalty is an important value, it is
a poor standard for judicial resolution. “Disloyalty” does not provide
courts with a consistent yardstick, but opens the door to the
individual judgment of judges. Instead of relying on disloyalty, courts
should examine whether the criticism was detrimental to the
employer. And courts should assign to the employer the burden of
proving that the employee’s criticism caused the harm.
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